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Bankers	knew	the	risks	they	were	taking	before	the
2008	crisis
Top	executives	of	US	banks	that	experienced	huge	losses	in	the	2008
crisis	sold	their	own	shares	well	before	the	crisis	hit,	write	Özlem	Akın,
José	M.	Marín	and	José-Luis	Peydró.
Excessive	risk-taking	by	banks	is	often	associated	with	economic
recession.	A	key	question	for	policy	and	for	the	academic	literature	is
why	banks	take	excessive	risk.	There	are	two	(non-mutually-exclusive)
views.	First,	the	moral	hazard	view	implies	that	conflicts	of	interest	(agency	problems)	between	bank
shareholders/managers	and	bank	debt-holders/taxpayers	make	it	rational	for	banks	to	take	on	excessive	risk	(for
example,	greater	leverage),	because	of	explicit	and	implicit	bank	guarantees	such	as	deposit	insurance,	central
bank	liquidity,	and	government	bailouts.
Consistent	with	this	view,	bankers	understand	the	risks	involved	but	find	it	optimal	to	take	excessive	risks.
Moreover,	bankers’	incentives	are	affected	by	bonuses,	which	typically	are	tied	to	the	short	term	rather	than	long-
term	profitability	of	their	bets.	Therefore,	bank	insiders	such	as	the	chief	executive	and	chief	financial	officers,	or	the
chairman	of	the	board	contribute	to	the	standard	agency	problem	when	acting	on	behalf	of	shareholders,	but	also
when	acting	in	their	own	interests	and,	in	this	case,	against	the	interests	of	shareholders,	bondholders,	and
taxpayers.	Agency	problems	are	at	the	heart	of	modern	corporate	finance	theories	but	for	banks,	agency	problems
may	be	more	important	than	for	non-financial	firms	since	banks	are	more	leveraged	and	have	stronger	explicit	and
implicit	guarantees.	Second,	the	behavioural	view	states	that	banks	take	excessive	risks	because	they	neglect	the
possibility	of	extreme	events	(unlikely	tail	risks)	or	have	over-optimistic	beliefs.	In	the	extreme	end	of	this	view,
banks	were	not	aware	of	their	excessive	risk-taking	prior	to	the	crisis.
One	empirical	way	to	analyse	these	issues	is	to	document	what	insiders	were	doing	before	the	crisis.	In	a	recent
paper,	we	analyse	the	trading	behaviour	of	top	executives	in	US	banks.	We	use	executives’	trading	in	their	own
portfolios	to	proxy	their	understanding	of	excessive	risk	and	test	whether	US	banks’	performance	in	the	2007-08
crisis	is	related	to	bank	insiders’	sale	of	their	own	bank	shares	in	the	period	prior	to	the	peak	and	reversal	in	house
prices	in	the	second	quarter	of	2006.
We	find	robust	evidence	that	top-five	executives’	ex-ante	sales	of	their	own	bank	shares	predict	worse	bank	stock
returns	during	the	crisis.	Moreover,	we	find	that	the	top-five	executives’	significant	impact	is	stronger	for	banks	with
higher	ex-ante	exposure	to	the	real	estate	market	(that	is,	banks	more	exposed	to	the	real	estate	bubble).
An	increase	of	one	standard	deviation	of	top–five	executive	sales	leads	to	a	13.33	percentage	point	drop	in	stock
returns	during	the	crisis	period,	which	is	approximately	32%	of	the	40%	negative	returns	of	banks	with	above
average	exposure	to	real	estate.
All	in	all,	given	the	informational	content	of	bank	insider	trading	before	the	overall	real	estate	problems,	these
results	suggest	that	insiders	understood	the	large	risk-taking	in	their	banks,	they	were	not	simply	over-optimistic,
and	hence	the	insiders	in	the	riskier	banks	sold	more	before	the	crisis.
Finally,	we	investigate	the	link	between	bank	insiders’	sales	before	April	2006	and	bank-level	risk-taking	(leverage
and	real	estate	exposure)	and	pay-out	policy	(dividends)	immediately	after	the	real	estate	price	peak.	We	find	no
reaction	in	any	of	these	variables.	This	result	suggests	that	the	executives	of	riskier	banks	did	not	reduce	the	bank-
level	overall	risk	(by	reducing	leverage	or	real	estate	exposure).
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These	results	have	implications	not	only	for	corporate	finance	or	banking	theory	based	on	agency	problems,	but
also	for	the	understanding	of	financial	crises	and	public	policy	–	especially	on	the	recent	prudential	policy	measures
on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic.	The	evidence	is	consistent	with	agency	problems	in	the	banking	industry	being
important	in	driving	risk-taking	and,	therefore,	the	recent	policy	initiatives	on	higher	bank	capital	(including	Basel	III)
or	macroprudential	policies	around	the	world	may	be	useful	for	limiting	excessive	bank	risk-taking.	If	high	risk-taking
in	banks	were	exclusively	due	to	behavioural	reasons,	then	some	of	the	new	prudential	policies	providing	better
incentives	for	bankers	would	not	matter	at	all.
From	a	supervisory	perspective,	our	results	suggest	that	supervisors	and	policymakers	should	use	the	sales	of	top-
tier	management	staff	in	banks	as	an	early	warning	signal	of	potential	excessive	risk-taking	in	banks.	But	once
bankers	are	aware	that	this	measure	is	being	used,	it	may	lose	its	predictive	power.
Moreover,	our	results	may	also	yield	policy	implications	for	insider	trading	regulation	in	banking	institutions,
particularly	the	FSB-developed	Principles	of	Sound	Compensation	Practices	and	Implementation,	as	well	as	in
relation	to	several	proposals	on	board	oversight,	variable	versus	fixed	salary	schemes,	and	stock	options.	The
ability	to	trade	by	insiders	(selling	shares	of	their	own	bank	when	they	anticipate	that	their	excessive	risk-taking	may
lead	to	problems)	may	exacerbate	conflicts	of	interest
Banning	trading	by	bank	insiders	may	endogenously	result	in	lower	excessive	risk-taking	by	banks	and	operate	as	a
partial	substitute	for	bank	capital	regulation	or	macroprudential	policies.	But	banning	trading	by	bank	insiders	on
these	grounds	would	not	be	fully	justified	as	there	are	many	other	costs	and	benefits	involved	that	should	be
considered.
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	author’s	Anticipating	the	Financial	Crisis:	Evidence	from	Insider	Trading	in
Banks,	in	Economic	Policy,	and	appeared	originally	at	LSE	Business	Review
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